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The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home 
GERALD S. DICKINSON* 
The home enjoys a special place in American constitutional law. A 
doctrinal thread runs across the first five amendments that demarcates 
the home as a realm in which rights enjoy elevated protection. That 
thread covers rights involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-
incrimination, but inexplicably does not extend to takings. This stark 
dichotomy between the solicitude of the home for most rights and the 
opposite for takings produces a deep puzzle. 
 
This Article contends that the answer to this fundamental puzzle is that 
the Court’s takings doctrine, unlike the home-centric doctrines in the 
Bill of Rights, is infected with post-Lochner v. New York judicial 
deference to economic regulation. This has influenced the Court’s 
aversion to a special protections doctrine to homes under the Takings 
Clause. This Article argues that, as a matter of constitutional coherence 
theory, which prizes doctrinal symmetry and harmony, the Court 
should, in limited circumstances, extend the home-centric thread to 
protect homes in takings that expropriate title to or impact the economic 
value of homes. 
 
This Article also grapples with several broader methodological, 
doctrinal, and theoretical implications. First, the Court consistently 
applies atextual methods of interpretation of the home. Second, this 
atextual interpretive pattern of influence supports this Article’s 
proposition that the home-centric doctrinal thread should extend to 
takings. Finally, a congruent home-centric Bill of Rights that extends to 
takings aligns neatly with constitutional coherence theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The home occupies a special place within the Constitution.1 Americans’ 
admiration “for the sanctity of the home” is linked to the individual, the family, 
and the fabric of society.2 The home is the “moral nexus between liberty, 
privacy, and freedom of association” and property.3 This sentiment is the basis 
of the Supreme Court’s distinctive protections to the home. The Court has had 
to grapple with the intersection of the meaning of the “home” and the nature of 
individual rights across a range of constitutional provisions. This engagement 
has produced a stark dichotomy and a deep puzzle. In most contexts, the Court 
finds reason to grant special solicitude to a zone of constitutional protection 
emanating from the distinctive nature of the home. The Court has, in other 
words, extended itself to textually adhere or doctrinally shape its jurisprudence 
to protect the home, as opposed to other places and spaces. That solicitude is 
entirely absent when it comes to the Takings Clause. 
To appreciate this dichotomy, take for example the Court’s relatively recent 
cases where the home was at the center of the Court’s review. In Kelo v. City of 
New London, Justice Stevens upheld the seizure of homes for economic 
development purposes as justifiable under the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause.4 Yet, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the late Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
 1 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978, 
996−1002 (1982). 
 2 Id. at 1013. 
 3 Id. at 991. 
 4 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005). 
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elevated the right to bear arms in the “hearth and home” above all other interests 
under the Second Amendment.5 This is odd. The Second Amendment does not 
textually say that the right to bear arms enjoys greater protection in the home.6 
Likewise, the Fifth Amendment does not textually preclude or grant special 
compensation formulas or heightened scrutiny when homes are subject to 
physical or regulatory takings.7 To make his atextual leap in the Second 
Amendment, Justice Scalia, who purported to ascribe to “public meaning” 
originalism, leaned on the Fourth Amendment’s explicit homebound protections 
arising from Payton v. New York.8 There, the Court explained that “the physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”8 Justice Scalia then extended such protections in Kyllo 
v. United States.9 However, in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Stevens—to 
the dismay of Justice Thomas in his dissent—was uninterested in equating the 
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure protections in the home with the idea 
that such protections similarly extend to physically taking homes.10 Yet, the 
home-centric doctrinal acrobatics employed by Justice Scalia have also been 
exercised in other areas of constitutional interpretation throughout the Bill of 
Rights. 
For example, the Court had no trouble lifting the sanctity of the home in 
Stanley v. Georgia, extolling that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it 
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, 
what books he may read or what films he may watch.”11 The Court later 
expanded its focus from freedom of mind and thought in the home12 to 
protections to “privacy and freedom of association in the home.”13 Notice again 
that nothing in the First Amendment remotely offers special protections to or 
within homes.15 There are, however, examples of textual clarity, if not, purity, 
of the home in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7 Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (Justice Scalia embracing an interpretation of the 
Constitution that is “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 
731 (1931)). 
 8 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). He noted that “in the case of the 
search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area 
of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the 
minimal expectation of privacy that exists.” Id. 
 10 See infra Part IV.A. 
 11 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasis added). 
 12 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973). 
 13 Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d, 413 
U.S. 528 (1973). 
 14 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Co. v. Sawyer gave credence to the Third Amendment’s textual prohibition of 
quartering soldiers in a home during peacetime, noting that “even in war time, 
[the Third Amendment requires that] seizure of needed military housing must 
be authorized by Congress.”15 And in Boyd v. United States, the Court explained 
that its Fourth Amendment search and seizure and Fifth Amendment criminal 
procedure protections almost run directly into each other, thus giving the home 
a special place of protection from self-incrimination.16 Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, however, is devoid of special protections to homes and is equally 
wanting of any special protections in the home. 
The Takings Clause, generally, protects homes from takings that do not 
satisfy the public use requirement or that fail to pay just compensation.18 There 
is nothing special about those well-established limitations; they apply equally 
to most forms of private property. It is not as if Justice Stevens in, say, Kelo was 
doctrinally or textually handicapped from doing in takings what Justice Scalia 
did with guns in Heller or Justice Marshall did with smut in Stanley—that is, 
formulate a methodological and theoretical interpretation of the home to 
conclude that a special zone of protection existed. Yet, the Court has simply 
refused to do so in takings. Why is this? 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo offers perhaps the ultimate clue to solving 
this mystery. His dissent employs an intradoctrinal maneuver by juxtaposing the 
Fourth Amendment and the Takings Clause. There, he was alarmed at the 
majority’s refusal to protect the home, noting that the Court has “elsewhere [in 
the Fourth Amendment] recognized ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of 
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the 
Republic,’” and that “[t]hough citizens are safe from the government in their 
homes, the homes themselves are not.”18 Importantly, he then stated, “the 
[majority] tells us that we are not to ‘second-guess the [legislative’s] considered 
judgments’” but the real issue is “whether the government may take the 
infinitely more intrusive step [than unlawfully searching a home] of tearing 
down the petitioners’ homes.”20 As a result, Justice Thomas argued, something 
has “gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.”20 
He continued, “[w]e would not defer to a legislature’s determination of the 
various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home 
would be reasonable,” because we have recognized the “overriding respect for 
the sanctity of the home.”21 Indeed, the uprooting of persons from their homes 
is, to Justice Thomas, a “justification for intrusive judicial review” as set forth 
 
 15 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 16 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 18 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 19 Id.  
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. (emphasis added). 
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in United States v. Carolene Products.22 Several major methodological and 
theoretical implications about the “constitutional home” emerge in those few 
lines buried in Justice Thomas’s dissent. 
First, Justice Thomas’s dissent implicitly answers why there exists 
asymmetry of the home in the Bill of Rights. The Takings Clause is infected 
with post-Lochner v. New York deference to economic legislation; the other 
homebound amendments are not. The Court’s home-centric jurisprudence 
involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination—as opposed to 
takings—simply has nothing to do with economic legislation, and thus are 
immune to the Court’s post-Lochner deferential treatment to social and 
economic regulations. They are, in other words, primarily fundamental rights 
issues that have shaped a doctrine amenable to protections of homes where 
liberty and privacy concerns are most pronounced. While the Court’s 
development of an exactions doctrine provides heightened standards of review 
in disputes over land use permitting, the level of scrutiny and the rulings, in and 
of themselves, have not risen to the level of Lochner-era dismay for social and 
economic legislation.23 
Second, Justice Thomas’s dissent implicitly alludes to a longing for 
adherence to coherence theory in constitutional interpretation. His argument is 
that if the Fourth Amendment provides protections to homes (albeit within the 
zone of privacy), then it would seem that, as a matter of consistency and 
symmetry, the Court should likewise extend similar special protections to homes 
threatened by condemnation for purposes of economic development under the 
Fifth Amendment. Taken to its logical conclusion, if smut, guns, soldiers, 
searches, and self-incrimination all enjoy some form of protection or liability 
regarding the home, then takings should neatly provide a similar result as a 
matter of uniformity. This Article proceeds in four Parts. 
Part II revisits the Court’s jurisprudence protecting the “home” across the 
first five amendments. The exercise reveals an imbalance and lack of complete 
coherence in constitutional interpretation: the Court has carved out home-centric 
doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination, yet 
the Court offers no equivalent express interest in or direct protection to the home 
in its takings jurisprudence.25 There is a tendency among property25 and 
 
 22 Id. at 521. 
 23 See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its 
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 607–08 (1996); infra Part III.B.  
 24 See infra Part III. I recognize that home-centric protections extend beyond the Bill 
of Rights, as the Court has found a right to consensual sodomy in the home. See Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). However, this Article focuses on the peculiar schism 
in the first five amendments where home protections are absent from the Takings Clause and 
the Court’s takings jurisprudence. 
 25 Property scholars have not engaged in textual and doctrinal interpretive 
methodologies to reorient the homebound amendments in the Bill of Rights. Margaret Radin 
has analyzed her theory of “personhood” through the lens of the Court’s decisions giving 
privacy and liberty protections to the home under its First and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. See Radin, supra note 1, at 911–1002. In doing so, she identified the 
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constitutional26 law scholars to make light of this stark dichotomy. Some go as 
far as to ignore the schism by reiterating that the Takings Clause offers 
protections to homes, yet do not acknowledge that the Court’s takings doctrine 
fails to provide special protections to homes, as opposed to other doctrines in 
the Bill of Rights. This Part revisits this underexplored lacuna27 within the 
 
“anomalous” nature of the Court’s takings jurisprudence lacking any similar protection to 
the “home,” contemplating a special class of property protections to a family home against 
government takings. Id. at 1006. But Radin neither expressly connects all five amendments 
utilizing interpretive methodologies nor explains why there exists this abrupt departure of 
protections to the “home” under the Takings Clause. It is worth noting that the Court’s 
announcement that the Second Amendment also entails a liberty protection to bear arms in 
the “home and hearth” arrived in 2008, nearly twenty-five years after Radin’s 
groundbreaking article. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) 
(holding that the Second Amendment protects individuals’ rights to carry guns in the home). 
Benjamin Barros, likewise, has covered the Court’s First and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in a non-interpretive manner proselytizing the “home,” yet when arriving at 
the Takings Clause, Barros merely ponders that the Court’s failure in its Kelo v. City of New 
London decision to “address the unique nature of the home is striking” in light of the “litany 
of areas in which homes are given special legal treatment.” D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a 
Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 297 (2006). Barros, like others, fails to 
provide any explanation for this “striking” fact or embark on the question of why the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence lacks home-centric protections. See id. 
 26 Few scholars have recognized this constitutional puzzle, and only a handful have 
explored the fundamental question of why this schism exists across the first five 
amendments. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 
1776 (2011) [hereinafter Amar, America’s Lived Constitution]. Amar identifies the Takings 
Clause as protecting private property, including homes, broadly, and that judges might be 
“vigilant” in protecting the home by special just compensation calculations. Id. But Amar’s 
treatment of the home under each of the amendments is cursory, and he, like others, misses 
an opportunity to resolve the puzzle by asking the bigger question of why the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence departs from its other homebound amendments. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 267 (1998). While Amar has noted that 
protections to the home under the Constitution were largely a result of the post-
Reconstruction era where the Third Amendment bridged together a “home-centric Second 
Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from the beginning protective of the private 
domain,” he merely explains that the prevailing dichotomy between “privacy” and 
“property” may have something to do with distinctions in protections to homes. Id.  
 27 Constitutional law scholars have only partially pieced together the amendment puzzle 
presented in this Article, and none are fixated on the Court’s home-centric void under its 
takings jurisprudence or attempted to offer explanations for the departure. Darrell Miller has 
drawn parallels and contradictions between the Second and Fourth Amendments to argue 
that the right to bear arms in the “home” and in public should be tempered by the First 
Amendment’s lack of protections to “smut” in public. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: 
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1278 (2009) 
(arguing for courts to “[t]reat the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity [in the home] under the First 
Amendment,” and making tacit reference to homebound conceptions across the first five 
amendments). But Miller declines to extend his proposal, let alone analyze the other 
“homebound” amendments, especially the Takings Clause, in his piece. Stephanie Stern 
similarly argues for less emphasis on the “home” under Fourth Amendment search and 
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“penumbra of home-related rights” to better appreciate the nature of this 
constitutional puzzle.28 
Part III answers the question of why the Court’s takings jurisprudence is 
devoid of home protections by arguing that the Court’s first five home-centric 
doctrines in the Bill of Rights are immune to and shielded from the Court’s 
embrace of post-Lochner era judicial deference to economic regulation.29 
However, the Court’s takings jurisprudence, unlike its homebound counterparts, 
is focused on advancing a body of law that primarily falls in line with preserving 
the post-Lochner judicial repudiation of substantive due process review of 
economic legislation. 
Part IV seeks to ground this Article’s call for home-centric harmony across 
the Bill of Rights in coherence theory.30 If the Court’s goal is to read the 
document with an eye towards consistency and accord, then it has arguably 
failed in the context of a person’s property and privacy rights in the home given 
the inexplicable absence of special home protections in the Takings Clause. 
Otherwise, the most logical alternative interpretation would be for the Court to 
employ a strictly textualist method of interpretation to achieve coherence by 
extending special protections to the home in the Bill of Rights only where the 
text commands in the Third and Fourth Amendments. But, of course, such an 
alternative is a far more radical departure from longstanding home-centric 
 
seizure jurisprudence, but like Miller, never gets around to tying the Court’s other 
amendment jurisprudence on the home together to offer a coherent understanding of what 
makes protecting homes from takings different from protecting smut, guns, or soldiers. See 
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 905 (2010) (arguing to replace emphasis on the physical home 
under Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence with narrower residential privacy 
interests). While John Fee notes that “[f]ederal constitutional law recognizes the unique 
status of the home in several ways” under the First, Third and Fourth Amendments. John 
Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786 (2006). 
He leaves gaps in homebound interpretations in the Second Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination clause and concludes that legislative action is required (as 
opposed to Supreme Court doctrine) to absolutely bar taking homes. Id. at 788−89; see also 
Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and Takings 
Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 4, 18–28 (2009) (arguing that “home searches” under the Fourth 
Amendment “should be viewed as takings” under the Fifth Amendment). Thomas 
Sprankling covers the Third and Fifth, but does not offer an assessment of the home across 
the first four amendments in relation to the Takings Clause and does not, as this Article does, 
explore why the Court’s takings jurisprudence neglects to offer greater protections to homes. 
See Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of 
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 112 (2012) (arguing 
that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should be read to protect homes from takings in 
light of the Third Amendment’s protection to the home); see also Michael A. Cottone, The 
Textualist Third Amendment, 82 TENN. L. REV. 537, 540–41, 541–54 (2015) (engaging in 
contextual and intratextual approaches to the Third Amendment). 
 28 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (1975). 
 29 See Fee, supra note 27, at 788–89. Fee mentions that “in contrast to other areas of 
the law, eminent domain law” is highly deferential. Id. 
 30 See infra Part IV. 
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jurisprudence. Instead, the Court seems content to employ a purposivist and 
largely precedent-based methodological approach to home limitations in a 
variety of contexts to achieve coherence. This history of atextualism’s 
predominance in the home raises the specter that, instead of traditional 
explanations, such as the privacy versus property dichotomy, constitutional 
coherence theory is the underlying influence for the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation. Thus, such a theory should influence the home-centric doctrinal 
thread to extend to takings. As Richard Fallon explains: [I]f the conclusions fail 
to cohere into a uniform prescription for how the case or issue ought to be 
resolved, then any or all of the individual conclusions may be reexamined, and 
the results adjusted . . . in an effort to achieve a uniform outcome.31 What Fallon 
and other adherents of coherence theory mean is that the Court, in striving for 
consistency, ought to adjust the traditional interpretive tools of structure, text, 
doctrine, and history in a manner that achieves a uniform, coherent outcome. 
Thus, where incoherence and inconsistency exist, the Court should adjust 
some of the tools, such as textualism and doctrinalism, to arrive at the most 
coherent conclusion. As a result, if faced with a takings challenge where 
plaintiffs are homeowners who request the Court seek harmony with the rest of 
its home-centric Bill of Rights doctrines to specially protect the home, the Court 
should engage, for example, in some formulation of atextualism and 
intradoctrinalism, to achieve a coherent, uniform outcome. The Court’s 
prevailing takings doctrine fails to conclude that homes deserve greater 
protections above all other property interests. Thus, it should, in limited 
circumstances, find for special compensation formulas, per se and categorical 
tests, or basic heightened standards of review where homes are subject to taking. 
What we are concerned with, then, as readers and interpreters of the Constitution 
as law, is the ability to read into the document “consistency rather than 
inconsistency.”32 Indeed, the dual methodologies of textualism and doctrinalism 
fit like a glove into coherence theory, because both methods espouse a “certain 
undeniable aesthetic attraction, appealing to ideals of symmetry and 
harmony.”33 
 
 31 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1240 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 32 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (1999). 
 33 Id. at 799. Note that textualism is often referred to as “structural” or “historical” 
interpretations of the canon. Scholars continue to debate the semantics. For example, Phil 
Bobbitt set forth six modalities (or methods) of interpretation, which include historical, 
textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–119 (1982). Akhil Amar argues that “structural” and 
“historical” interpretations are “documentarian” as they seek to pull meaning from the 
document itself. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 30 (2000). He also refers to the method of interpreting the Constitution to 
identify pattern recognition by juxtaposing adjoining and nonadjoining amendments, 
clauses, and provisions within and across the document as “intratextualism.” See generally 
id. For purposes of this Article, specifically Part II, I am implicitly engaging in both textual 
and doctrinal methods of interpretation across the first five amendments, with a special 
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However, it is the atextual or doctrinal interpretive pattern of influence 
grounded in coherence theory that supports this Article’s proposition that the 
doctrinal thread should extend to takings to achieve coherence by altering its 
prevailing takings doctrine to impose special protections on homes, if not 
homeowners. A home-centric Takings Clause would, indeed, bring a variety of 
constitutional phenomena involving the home into a coherent conception of 
constitutional interpretation across the Bill of Rights. Few, if any, scholars have 
engaged these methodological tools and theoretical explanations in the context 
of the “constitutional home.” 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S HOMEBOUND DOCTRINES REVISITED 
William Blackstone has raised the home as a paramount legal concept under 
American law. He noted that “every man’s house is looked upon by the law to 
be his castle.”34 Such sentiments have led to the castle doctrine under Supreme 
Court precedent; that is, a person’s home is his castle, and the common law 
traditionally protected the house as a “castle of defence and asylum.”35 Notable 
constitutional law scholars, such as John Fee and Akhil Amar, have noted 
houses as being “singled out above and beyond all buildings” and “a special 
place for privacy.”36 As a result, both federal constitutional law and statutory 
law “recognize the home as a special place worth preserving.”37 In fact, it was 
the Republican Party that influenced legislation during Reconstruction to 
promote homeownership.38 But, the home is not just a special place. 
The locus offers something “uniquely personal,” thus “making it different 
and in a sense of higher value than other forms of real property.”40 As Jeanie 
Suk has explained, the “[h]ome has been central to the articulation of 
constitutional rights, including the right against unreasonable search and 
seizure, the right to due process, the right of privacy, and (recently) the right to 
bear arms,” which “lies at the center of the legal edifice that helps to construct 
human experience.”40 Likewise, the home is “treated more favorably”41 than 
other types of property, largely because the home is “inextricably part of” our 
 
emphasis on doctrinalism as the core interpretive method that justifies extending the 
homebound doctrinal thread to the Takings Clause as a matter of coherence theory. 
 34 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288. 
 35 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 
(1995) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *288). 
 36 Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 26, at 1772. 
 37 Fee, supra note 27, at 786–87. 
 38 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 
68 (1988). 
 39 Fee, supra note 27, at 793. 
 40 JEANIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW 3, 133 (2009). 
 41 See Barros, supra note 25, at 255. 
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society.42 Indeed, “with very few exceptions—notably that of the home—the 
Framers’ conception of liberty related primarily to persons rather than places.”43 
But, in some circumstances, the “right to possess a home is given more 
protection than the right to possess other types of property,” such as 
“[h]omestead exemptions, rights of redemption in foreclosure, just-cause 
eviction statutes, and residential rent control.”44 Some argue that the Framers 
“envisioned a private, parochial, and rather sedentary people”45 and that the 
home was “singled out for special constitutional treatment” because it was 
deemed a “consecrated constitutional location” immune from intrusion.46 Even 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has described the home as a 
“sanctuary.”47 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found a protected liberty and 
dignity interest to engage in private consensual sexual activity between 
consenting adults, especially in the home.48 
Indeed, jurists join legal scholars in exalting over the home. A few state 
supreme courts have concluded that the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination protections created a “zone of privacy” 
regarding security to and in the home.49 The Ninth Circuit recognized in United 
States v. Craighead that the “home occupies a special place in the pantheon of 
constitutional rights,” including privacy and self-defense-related protections to 
the “home” under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments,50 adding 
that the Fifth Amendment’s protections to custodial interrogations extended to 
a suspect’s own home.52 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has constructed a 
Constitution that “manifests a special concern with the protection of the 
home”52—except, of course, within its takings jurisprudence. This is a striking, 
 
 42 Radin, supra note 1, at 1013. 
 43 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 595 (2009). 
 44 See Barros, supra note 25, at 276. 
 45 Zick, supra note 43, at 539. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) 
(recognizing that tenants have a “fundamental interest” in their housing). 
 48 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 49 See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498–502 (1975). This was stated before the 
Court’s 2008 ruling in Heller, which lifted the “hearth and home” as a special place to bear 
arms. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  
 50 In United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (2008), the court stated: 
Under the First Amendment, the “State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in 
his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” The Second 
Amendment prohibits a federal “ban on handgun possession in the home.” The Third 
Amendment forbids quartering soldiers “in any house” in time of peace “without the 
consent of the Owner.” The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in our ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 232 (2008); see also Miller, supra note 27, at 1305 (arguing that 
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yet strange, dichotomy that I will explore in just a moment. But first, let us 
explore the Court’s home-centric doctrines involving smut. 
A. Smut 
We begin by exploring the Court’s handling of cases involving protections 
to the home under its First Amendment jurisprudence with an eye towards 
doctrinal interpretations, because the text of the First Amendment does not 
expressly mention the home.54 The First Amendment, instead, recognizes the 
state’s interest in regulating and protecting against obscenity, but at the same 
time protects the right of a person to receive information and ideas, despite the 
questionable social value or worth of the material.54 This includes prohibiting, 
to some extent, the state from regulating a person’s private thoughts.55 But what 
about a person engaging (or indulging) in his desire to read and think about such 
material in his home? 
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia held that the First Amendment 
protects a person’s right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home, 
even though the Court conceded that the state had the power to regulate 
obscenity in the public sphere.56 In Stanley, police executed a search warrant to 
enter Robert Eli Stanley’s home, where they found adult film.57 Stanley was 
later arrested after the police determined the film was in violation of a Georgia 
statute.59 
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion offers clues into the Court’s 
constitutional take on the “home.” There, he reiterated the Court’s position that 
a person has a “right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy 
of his own home” and that state regulation cannot “reach into the privacy of 
one’s own home.”59 Perhaps most worthy of attention is this: “If the First 
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, 
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch.”60 
The Court’s ruling in Stanley steadfastly adhered to the “home” as a castle 
under the First Amendment, reiterating the heightened protection that the 
Constitution gives to such activity in the home. The Court followed up its 
Stanley decision in United States v. Williams, where it dealt with Secret Service 
agents who “obtained a search warrant for William’s home” and found hard 
 
guns outside the home should be treated the same way as obscene materials are treated under 
the First Amendment). 
 53 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 54 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1969). 
 55 Id. at 565–66. 
 56 Id. at 568. 
 57 Id. at 558. 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. at 565. 
 60 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
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drives that contained “images of real children engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.”61 The Court affirmed Stanley, but explained that lewd material and 
obscenity of underage children were not protected under the First Amendment.62 
Its decision in Osborne v. Ohio likewise found the Stanley ruling “firmly 
grounded in the First Amendment.”63 
However, it is important to note here that while one may view and enjoy 
such material in the home, a person is not protected, as the Court has stated in 
United States v. Orito, from distributing such material, even if from within the 
home.64 The Supreme Court then, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, refused to 
extend the protections of lewd material for noncommercial purposes, or in other 
words refused to interpret a “theater” as an equivalent to a home.65 Further, the 
Court has extended free speech protections to residential areas, paying heed to 
the home as a safe space for speech that cannot be infringed upon.66 However, 
the right to privacy must yield if particular activities in the home interfere with 
the public welfare.67 I will return to this particular limitation in Part III. 
Let us now turn to the Second Amendment, where protections to the “home” 
were most recently etched into the Court’s jurisprudence. 
B. Guns 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that a total ban on handguns 
in the “home” was tantamount to a complete ban on an entire class of arms, and 
that the state must permit a person to register and issue a license for the person 
to carry a gun in his home.68 The D.C. ordinance specifically required that a 
“lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all 
times, rendering it inoperable.”69 In striking down the ordinance, the Court 
showed its concern regarding any prohibition of firearms that extended to the 
home, because the “need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute” 
in the home and that handguns are regularly used to protect one’s home.70 The 
Court’s focus on the home was not by accident. Senator Samuel Pomeroy, 
during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that “Every 
man . . . should have the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family 
 
 61 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 291–92 (2008). 
 62 Id. at 288–89. 
 63 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 n.3 (1990) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 195 (1986)). 
 64 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141–42 (1973). 
 65 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–68 (1973). 
 66 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 
(1980); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); Gregory v. City of 
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125–26 (1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1949); 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).  
 67 Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 280 (1982). 
 68 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
 69 Id. at 628. 
 70 Id. 
2019] THE PUZZLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HOME 1111 
and his homestead.”71 Justice Scalia’s opinion ventured to the Revolutionary 
Era to unpack the significance of arms in the home, noting that “[i]n the colonial 
and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and 
weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.”72 
But, Justice Scalia’s opinion also offered an extensive explanation for why 
the locus of the firearm—the home—as opposed to other spaces or places not 
readily perceived as private is essential to Second Amendment protections. 
There, he stated that citizens prefer handgun possession in the home as a form 
of defense because such guns are “easier to store” and are “accessible” in the 
event of an emergency, such as when an intruder enters the home to try to 
wrestle away the gun.73 Justice Scalia, concerned with intruders like burglars, 
saw great value in being able to “lift and aim” a handgun in the home while 
dialing the police with the other free hand versus a long gun that required 
pointing the gun at the attacker.74 Besides the multitasking function that a small 
handgun apparently gives to gun owners when attacked in the home, Justice 
Scalia may be telling us more about the “home” than is apparent from a surface 
reading of Heller. He then departs from textualism and instead creatively inserts 
his own version of what the Constitution means by stating that “whatever else 
[the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”75 
But, as Justice Stevens explained the Framers’ intent, the idea that 
militiamen could “keep” firearms really meant that they could “store” such arms 
in their homes to be used in service when called upon, and that “[d]ifferent 
language surely would have been used to protect nonmilitary use and 
possession” of arms in the home had that been the intent of the Framers.76 As 
Justice Stevens argued, this simply did not include bearing the arms to protect 
the hearth and home. And, as Justice Breyer questioned, “[w]hat is [the] basis 
for finding [hearth and home] to be the core of the Second Amendment right?”77 
Is it really the case, largely supported by limited sources, such as a state court 
decision, that the Second Amendment protects, primarily, persons bearing an 
arm beside his or her bedside?78  
 
 71 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866). 
 72 Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25 (quoting State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (1980) 
(alteration in original)). 
 73 Id. at 629. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 635. 
 76 Id. at 650–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 77 Id. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alterations added). 
 78 Heller, 554 U.S. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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C. Soldiers 
The Third Amendment states that “[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner.”79 There was very 
little debate over the inclusion of an anti-quartering clause in the Constitution.81 
Most states strongly supported such a provision.82 While the Court has not 
directly reviewed a challenge grounded in the Third Amendment, its case law 
has offered useful summaries of the oft-neglected provision. The Amendment 
has been interpreted as a “property-based privacy interest” that protects “a 
fundamental right to privacy.”83 It has not been limited to mere fee simple 
ownership, but rather to any “lawful occupation or possession with a legal right 
to exclude others.”83 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court clarified property-based privacy 
protections under the Constitution.85 The Court reasoned that privacy, in and of 
itself, is based largely on a desire to be secure in their homes, such as having 
privacy in a marital relationship.85 Thus, “one who owns or lawfully possesses 
or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.”86 As a result of the Third Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions extending special protections to the home, the Court found a general 
penumbra of privacy in the home.87 Some have interpreted the amendment to 
solely embody a “fundamental value” of the “sanctity of the home” and that 
textually stretching the provision to include nonresidential and non-fee simple 
ownership or occupation is inappropriate.88 A literal, textual reading of the 
amendment only plausibly protects “fee simple owners of houses.”89 Likewise, 
the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer gave credence to the Third 
Amendment’s prohibition of quartering soldiers in a home during peace time, 
noting that the “Third Amendment [mandates] . . . in war time [any] seizure of 
needed military housing . . . be authorized by Congress.”90 
 
 79 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 80 Sprankling, supra note 27, at 128. 
 81 See id. 
 82 Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
 83 Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978)). 
 84 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
        85 See id. at 485–86 (discussing the expansive nature of privacy interests as they relate 
to marital relations).  
 86 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12. 
 87 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
protections against government invasions of privacy extend to the “sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life”). 
 88 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 967–68 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that, while “the home is a privileged place,” this protection does not encompass the 
occupational residences of correctional officers in the scope of their employment). 
 89 Id. at 968. 
 90 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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D. Searches 
The Court’s ruling in Payton v. New York is its longstanding pinnacle case 
drawing a fine line between searches and seizures in public spaces and those 
conducted in a person’s home.91 There, Justice Stevens’ opinion commingled 
search and seizure with the concept of the home, finding that while warrantless 
arrests in public may be constitutional, such arrests in the home are 
unconstitutional.92 The Court explained, “the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”93 
The Court went so far as to say that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, in 
and of itself, was to “guard against arbitrary governmental invasions of the 
home,”94 and that there existed a distinction between searches and seizures in 
the office as opposed to the home.95 However, it is important to note here that 
the dissent in Payton sought to rein in the home-centric emphasis of the 
majority’s opinion, noting that the “Fourth Amendment is concerned with 
protecting people, not places, and no talismanic significance is given to the fact 
that an arrest occurs in the home rather than elsewhere.”96 Still, the Court’s 
homebound approach to the Fourth Amendment influenced subsequent 
decisions. 
In Wilson v. Layne, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that a “media ride-along” 
of reporters into a person’s home while police conducted a search with a warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment.98 There, a group of homeowners, suing federal 
law enforcement officials under federal law, sought to protect the homebound 
precedent of the Court’s jurisprudence and extend such protections to not only 
warrantless searches in the home, but to third-party media and reporters who 
happen to enter the home during a lawful search.99 Indeed, this “ride-along 
intrusion” into a home runs afoul of the Court’s conception of the sanctity of the 
home.99 Further, at the core of the Fourth Amendment is what the Court believes 
to be the “right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”100 The Fourth Amendment provides for, 
 
 91 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to 
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line 
at the entrance to the house.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 585 (citation omitted). 
 94 Id. at 582 n.17. 
 95 Id. at 586 n.25. 
 96 Id. at 615 (White, J., dissenting). 
 97 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605 (1999). 
 98 See id. at 608 (highlighting petitioners who “contended that the officers’ actions in 
bringing members of the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest 
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights”). 
 99 Id. at 613 (“Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not 
enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home.”). 
 100 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 626–30 (1886)). 
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“The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”102 
However, the Supreme Court has also made clear that the protection is about 
“people,” not “places.”102 Even so, the Court has also acknowledged that the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections depend upon the locus, or where the individual 
is located at the time of the search, and whether he personally has an expectation 
of privacy in the place searched.103 
The Court made an explicit distinction between protections in the home in 
Rakas v. Illinois. There, the Court stated that there is a fine line regarding 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the home, which is often dependent upon 
whether the source of the reasonable expectation is “outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or 
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”104 Justice 
Rehnquist, in his majority opinion in Minnesota v. Carter, further acknowledged 
that the “text of the Amendment” meant only that persons “in ‘their’ houses” 
were protected.105 Yet, amidst the Court’s precedential broadening of the 
concept of the home as a protection, it also provided protections in “some 
circumstances” to a person housed in the home in another,106 such as an 
overnight guest, because it is “social custom” that should, likewise, be 
recognized as a daily expectation of privacy.107 Justice Stevens has noted that 
invasion of the home for search purposes without a warrant is “presumptively 
unreasonable.”108 This, the Court has noted, is a “firm line at the entrance to the 
house” that must not be crossed by police without a warrant.109 Justice White, 
animated by the threat of unchecked law enforcement invasions, explained that 
the home’s expectation of privacy “is plainly one that society is prepared to 
recognize as justifiable.”110 
Justice Scalia, the architect of the Second Amendment’s protections to the 
“hearth and home,” explained in Kyllo v. United States that “in the case of the 
search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most commonly 
litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in 
the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists” to withdraw 
that protection with new technology “not in general public use” that would erode 
 
 101 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 102 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 103 Id. (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 
U.S. 83, 83 (1998). 
 104 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978). 
 105 Carter, 525 U.S. at 89. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). 
 108 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004). 
 109 Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam). 
 110 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
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that privacy.111 Justice Stevens explained that scanning technology that does not 
physically penetrate the interior of the home is not the same as the physical 
penetration of the home that many would agree is an example of the chief evil 
against the Fourth Amendment.112 
It seems that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the “home” 
does not turn on expectations of privacy as the Court has previously stated, but 
rather on whether the property utilized for privacy is commercial or residential. 
The Fourth Amendment arguably treats commercial property differently by 
providing lesser protections to individuals than those owning or occupying a 
home.113 Indeed, searches and seizures regarding “purely commercial” 
transactions in the home of another, without any prior connection to the 
homeowner-householder, will not violate the Fourth Amendment.114 However, 
at the core of the protections is the “psychological primacy of privacy in the 
home” and the “political and historical role” that the home plays as a “haven” 
from government overreach.115 Some argue that the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to protect property.116 But the Court quickly disposed of property 
theories, explaining in Warden v. Hayden that “[w]e have recognized that the 
principal object of the [amendment] is the protection of privacy rather than 
property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers 
rested on property concepts.”117 
And finally, in Katz v. United States, the Court solidified its position that 
the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”118 Yet, the Court has 
downplayed other forms of property in comparison to the “home” when 
determining levels of protection.119 Justice Burger has explained expectations 
of privacy in a person’s automobile are less than a person’s home.120 A year 
later, Justice Burger noted that “open areas” are not analogous to the “curtilage” 
for purposes of aerial surveillance, and that residences have heightened 
expectations of privacy.121 Such distinctions, some argue, “illustrate[] how 
home-search cases provide additional justification for limiting protection 
 
 111 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasis omitted); see also United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 307 (1987) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)) (“[C]urtilage is ‘the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 
“sanctity of a man’s house and the privacies of life.”’”). 
 112 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 113 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987). 
 114 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
 115 Stern, supra note 27, at 913. 
 116 See Radin, supra note 1, at 998. 
 117 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
 118 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 119 See Stern, supra note 27, at 922. 
 120 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). 
 121 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that open areas 
in an industrial plant spread over a large geographic area are not akin to the “curtilage” of a 
dwelling). 
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outside of the home.”122 Some have raised concerns that elevating the home as 
subject to greater protections does not fit the empirical evidence, as “there are 
many, many more street encounters than searches of private homes.”123 
E. Self-Incrimination 
The Court’s ruling in Boyd v. United States expressly commingled the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections to unlawful searches and self-
incrimination in the home, with the text and accompanying doctrine from both 
amendments running “almost into each other.”124 There, the Court held that the 
doctrines: 
[A]pply to all invasions . . . of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, 
that constitutes the essence of the offense . . . it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
property . . . .125 
Indeed, the Court there explained that “[b]reaking into a house and opening 
boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and 
compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony, or of his private papers to be 
used as evidence to convict him of a crime, or to forfeit his goods” is in violation 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.126 The Court there laid out the case that 
the “compulsory production” of evidence against an accused is the same as 
compelling a person to be a witness against himself is prosecution, which is 
prohibited under the Fifth Amendment.127 
III. THE PUZZLE OF THE HOME-LESS TAKINGS CLAUSE 
The Takings Clause permits takings of “private property” so long as the 
government pays and the taking is for a public use.129 But the Court’s takings 
doctrine is devoid, unlike its homebound counterparts, of any special interest in 
or unique protection to the home.130 Why is this? Constitutional and property 
scholars would readily point to the privacy versus property dichotomy apparent 
 
 122 See Stern, supra note 27, at 922. 
 123 See id. (quoting William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1061–62 (1995)). 
 124 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. (stating that “compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony” or using “his 
private papers . . . to convict him”). 
 128 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 129 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (stating that the 
government may take an individual’s home in line with the Fifth Amendment if it pays just 
compensation). 
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on its face when exploring this question.131 In the context of property rights, the 
home is fungible and can be traded on the market for value, whereas the home 
protections elsewhere in the Bill of Rights cannot be traded on the market. The 
alienability of the home in the property context does not extend to the 
inalienability of the right to privacy. For example, a person cannot trade his or 
her privacy protection to viewing and enjoying smut in his or her home to the 
next-door neighbor for market value. Nor can a person sell his or her right to 
bear arms in the home to the government or trader on the market. In other words, 
the longstanding explanation to the puzzle presented in this Article is that most 
of the home protections in the Bill of Rights emanate from a zone of privacy 
rather than private property. And, of course, those are not the same. But this 
dichotomy, in and of itself, does not explain the atextual aberration of not 
extending special protections to the home in takings. The home-less Takings 
Clause is asymmetric with the rest of the Bill of Rights, and the prevailing 
explanation of privacy-based rights in the home versus property-based 
protections of the home is not the end of the story. 
For decades, the Court did not expressly provide for special protections to 
bearing arms in the home. It was not until Heller, and a particular Justice to 
write the opinion, that the Court arrived at a homebound doctrine in the Second 
Amendment.132 Likewise, a person cannot sell certain forms of smut from the 
home, such as child pornography, yet the Court offers special protection to 
viewing and enjoying permissible smut in the home.133 This property-based 
limitation on sale, but privacy-based exception on possession is evidence of the 
Court’s fast and loose play with privacy and property dimensions in the Bill of 
Rights. Indeed, the Court tends to interpret amendments and revisit its precedent 
in a variety of ways that satisfy its desire to find home-centric protections. 
Likewise, while takings law is redistributive in nature, it does not preclude a 
“special” right to the home carved out of the Bill of Rights. 
This Part contends that the answer to this textual and doctrinal riddle is that 
the Court’s home-centric doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and 
self-incrimination are immune to and shielded from the Court’s embrace of post-
Lochner era judicial deference to economic regulation.133 However, the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence, unlike its homebound counterparts, is focused on 
advancing a body of law that primarily falls in line with preserving the post-
Lochner judicial repudiation of substantive due process review of economic 
 
 130 See Fee, supra note 27, at 788 (“In contrast to other areas of law, eminent domain 
law regards the home as no different than any other kind of property . . . .”). 
 131 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 132 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
 133 See McUsic, supra note 23, at 647, 653; see also Fee, supra note 28, at 793 
(discussing place of “home” in eminent domain law in economic terms). Both McUsic and 
Fee note the deferential treatment that takings enjoys under current Court doctrine, but 
neither tie the deferential standard back to post-Lochner era deference broadly and how the 
other amendments are immune from such deference, instead benefitting from strict scrutiny. 
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legislation. This has hindered, but not fully foreclosed, the possibility of special 
protections to homes in the takings context. 
The text and history of the Takings Clause does not get scholars or jurists 
very far when determining whether there exists, or should exist, a special 
protection to the home. James Madison inserted the text into the draft 
Constitution, and it is unclear to this day what exactly he intended when writing 
those few words.135 The historical record is also minimal, showing little 
evidence of what other Framers intended with the clause.136 There was virtually 
no debate about the clause at the time of ratification.137 Some have argued that 
the purpose of the Takings Clause was to minimize the possibility of military 
seizures of personal and real property during wartime.138 Indeed, much of the 
Court’s takings jurisprudence has been carved out of thin air with little 
adherence to the original intent, especially the Court’s regulatory takings and 
exactions doctrine. Doctrinalism, on the other hand, offers a useful approach to 
understanding the Court’s aversion to the home in light of the lack of history 
and text to glean from. 
It would seem that even if the Fifth Amendment textually lacks the word 
“home” or “house,” unlike the Third and Fourth Amendments, protections to 
the house could still be read into the Court’s takings doctrine. Why not? This is 
exactly what the Court did in its First and Second Amendment jurisprudence, as 
well as its self-incrimination clause in the Fifth. Justice Scalia, specifically, 
offered the latest rendition of conservative doctrinalism to carve out the “hearth 
and home” protection in gun rights.138 Likewise, he did the same in Kyllo, 
raising issue with searches and seizures that threatened the home, as opposed to 
other places ordinarily understood to be domains of privacy.140 But something 
is afoot beyond mere sloppy textualism and doctrinalism or, for that matter, the 
prevailing privacy versus property dichotomy for why the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence is “home-less.” The inexplicable absence of home protections in 
takings can also be explained by the Court’s post-Lochner deferential treatment 
of social and economic legislation. 
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A. Takings in the Lochner Era 
Indeed, revisiting Lochner begins to piece together this previously 
incomplete constitutional puzzle, as it identifies the Court’s deference to “class 
legislation” as the crux of the home-centric schism in the Takings Clause and 
the rest of the Bill of Rights. The infamous Lochner Court derived the doctrine 
of “substantive economic due process” from the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.140 The Court was unabashedly hostile to “class legislation” that 
advanced social policies and sought to limit government power to regulate 
economic relationships through a conservative yet judicially active approach.141 
The Court carved out its doctrine targeting economic legislation, which pursued 
social change, by narrowing its inquiry to whether the government action in 
dispute was within the police power of the state.142 The economic legislation 
and regulations attacked by the Court, including some federal courts, included 
regulatory pricing, restriction on businesses, graduated taxes, and labor 
legislation.143 One of the primary explanations for the Court’s lurch towards 
anti-class legislation was that the Court despised unequal legislation.144 By 
doing so, the Court found a way to review the substantive nature of government 
economic regulation and legislation by asking whether the government 
exercised its police powers. As a result, the Court severely limited the scope of 
the state police powers. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was the origin 
of the Court’s Lochner-era treatment of private property rights. The Industrial 
Revolution brought significant social and economic transformations in 
American society. Such change also gave rise to social problems, such as 
poverty and inequality. Congress and state legislatures stepped in to mitigate 
these harms. However, the Court would hand down rulings that struck such 
legislation as an interference with property and liberty. There, the Court found 
redress and protections against deprivation of property without due process.145 
For the Court, the Constitution protected property from government 
interference.146 To rein in government overreach in the realm of private property 
rights, the Court gave special meaning and interpretation to due process, takings, 
and property.147 The late 1800s Court cases were testing grounds for the 
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Lochner Court to scrutinize legislation that affected property rights. For 
example, the Court departed from its longstanding interpretation of eminent 
domain and public use as dealing strictly with physical seizures of title when it 
gave credence to takings that rendered property unusable.148 In Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co., the Court found flooding of private property as a result of 
government action to constitute a taking of private property.149 The Court then 
turned to economic legislation that affected private property rights.150 
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago and Fallbrook 
Irrigation District v. Bradley, the Court accelerated the theory that it could 
determine whether a deprivation of property could be considered a taking of 
property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, all in an attempt to forge a 
bloc of doctrine to preclude class legislation in the areas of private property 
rights.151 Then, the Court’s jurisprudence morphed into a combination of criteria 
to determine if the state deprived a property owner of due process protected 
rights and whether the action was a taking of private property.152 This allowed 
the Court to shift its focus on core property interests such as title, possession, 
and exclusion to property interests such as economic value.153 In other words, 
“the notion of property” became an abstract category of economic interests.154 
In Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, the Court equated 
“expected earning power” with traditional definitions of property.155 Or, for 
example, the Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. stated that taxes 
were the equivalent of property, and that legislation prohibiting direct taxation 
on real property or income was unconstitutional.156 The concept of property 
became malleable beyond the core possession and title definitions, which gave 
the Court flexibility to attack regulations on property rights, particularly those 
that were redistributive in nature.157 
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As Molly McUsic explained, economic rights became property in the eyes 
of the Court, and therefore, during the Lochner era, legislation and regulation 
that affected property could be subject to substantive due process inquiries.158 
Rate regulation, specifically, was subject to due process inquiries under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.160 In Munn v. Illinois, for example, the Court found 
that such rate regulations on railroads were the equivalent of the state forcing an 
owner to run a “business with less return than he would receive without the 
regulation,”160 thus viewing such economic regulations as amounting to takings 
of property for public use without just compensation.161 In other words, where 
the regulation significantly reduced rates, the Court would find a taking for 
public use without just compensation because the state “cannot require a railroad 
corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that 
which in law amounts to a taking.”162 
The consistent rulings on economic regulations as equivalent to seizing 
private property gained considerable support in subsequent cases in the early 
1900s.163 In Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 
the Court found that requiring a railroad company to make a track connection 
was “not a mere administrative regulation,” but was a taking of property since 
the company had to “expend money” and was prohibited from certain “uses” of 
the land.164 By the 1920s, the Court had concluded that regulations “could take 
property by limiting its use or value, and such a taking would contravene” due 
process.165 For example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes 
explained that legislation affecting the coal mining rights of companies was not 
a valid exercise of the police power, but was instead a taking.167 Because coal 
mining is valuable and a regulation making it “commercially impracticable to 
mine certain coal” is the same as destroying it, the regulation is thus an 
unconstitutional taking.167 In Block v. Hirsh, the Court upheld a rent control 
statute.169 However, in doing so, the Court reiterated its Lochner-esque doctrine 
that the police power may be scrutinized if it goes too far as to become nothing 
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more than a regulation equivalent to a taking.170 Thus, regulations on rents 
“might amount to a taking without due process of law.”170 
Indeed, the Court “routinely” found economic regulations and legislation 
where property was affected to equate to takings because it limited its use or 
economic value.171 The market value became as constitutionally protected as 
traditional sources of “property.”172 Thus, any reduction in market value, the 
Court supposed, was a deprivation of property by taking.173 This tied 
“economic” legislation, and arguably “social” legislation, to the Court’s 
doctrinal rubrics under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
increasingly the Takings Clause. The result was that the Court’s jurisprudence 
viewed any and all substantive property-based economic measures as “subject 
to judicial supervision, and all could have been invalidated under the Court’s 
doctrine.”174 The Lochner Court’s expansive view of property meant that “[i]f 
economic value is property, then any change in the common-law rules could be 
an unconstitutional infringement on property.”175 
Amidst the Lochner era’s revolt against legislation affecting liberty and 
property, the Court never once raised the prospect that legislation that affected 
specific property interests, such as homes, deserved greater scrutiny. Instead, a 
diverse range of property, from land to market value, was given broad 
protections under the Court’s substantive due process inquiries from 
regulations.177 The dawn of the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine saw an 
opportunity to limit takings that infringed too significantly on classes of 
homeowners. Yet, in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court failed to lift the “home” 
to the pantheon heights it receives in its sister amendments. 
There, Mr. and Mrs. Mahon sued to prevent a coal company from mining 
under their house, which would remove the supports and cause subsidence of 
the surface.177 At the time, an anti-subsidence statute prohibited mining under 
residential dwellings to prevent destruction of residences for the public good.179 
However, the house in dispute had a deed that reserved an estate interest in the 
subsurface for the coal company, giving it the right to mine under the surface.180 
The Court struck down the statute as going too far by diminishing the coal 
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company’s property rights in the estate.181 As noted, the ruling was once part of 
the Court’s long line of takings cases that scrutinized economic legislation. 
The Court paid little attention to or special care for the “single private 
house” in dispute, instead carving out a new takings doctrine that, as applied to 
the case at hand, arguably under-protected the house.181 Justice Holmes’s lack 
of conviction for the “single private house” is instructive. He minimizes the 
seriousness of the house by noting that “[t]his is the case of a single private 
house.”182 There is “[n]o doubt there is a public interest even in this,” but 
“[s]ome existing rights may be modified even in such a case.”183 Notably, the 
Court stated that where exercises of police power are in dispute, the “greatest 
weight is given to the judgment of the legislature.”184 Ultimately, the Court 
departed from its longstanding separation of takings and exercises of police 
power by introducing the concept that if regulations “go too far,” they will be 
deemed “regulatory takings” in violation of the Takings Clause.185 
Notwithstanding the Court’s lack of interest in homebound protections, the 
Court’s heavy-handed approach to constraining state exercises of police power 
that impinged on liberty and property slowly receded. In the post-Lochner era, 
largely as a result of the Court’s command in Carolene Products, the Court 
instead embraced deference to economic legislation affecting property interests 
in takings that starkly contrasted with the Lochner Court. But at the same time, 
the Court embarked on a crusade of strict scrutiny in cases where fundamental 
rights were central to a dispute, thus giving the Court a useful tool to address 
special protections to homes in non-economic legislation cases in which 
fundamental rights converged with longstanding principles of sanctity of the 
home. 
B. Deference Post-Lochner 
The period after 1937 is when the Court, thanks to its ruling in Carolene 
Products, abandoned its economic substantive due process doctrine for a more 
relaxed, deferential standard to government economic activity.186 Justice 
Stone’s famed footnote four set forth distinctions that would inevitably remove 
property rights protections from substantive due process review, but leave 
fundamental rights in the domain of strict scrutiny.187 The Court carved out an 
exception to its departure from close scrutiny of economic and social legislation 
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by remaining tethered to the doctrine where fundamental rights were at stake, 
including freedom of religion, right to privacy, right to self-defense, and 
freedom of press, speech, and association.188 
The new test, it was determined, was one that set forth whether “in the light 
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”189 In other words, strict scrutiny 
would be applied to alleged violations of fundamental rights, but rational basis 
review, and subsequently deference, would be applied to economic regulations. 
At the same time, economic and property rights would no longer enjoy the same 
Lochner-era searching judicial inquiry of government regulation.191 Justice 
Stone explained that rational basis review—the oft-recited standard as to 
whether a regulation bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest—would be applied to regulations and statutes that 
entailed life, liberty, and property, but that fundamental rights still enjoyed 
substantive due process review.191 Scholars have questioned the Court’s 
Carolene Products elevation of fundamental rights as worthy of strict scrutiny, 
yet relegation of economic and property rights as merely rational basis.192 
Unlike the first four Amendments, the Takings Clause is limited in 
protecting private property by the Due Process Clause’s requirement of rational 
basis review of legislative action in economic and social kind.193 Unenumerated 
rights, such as privacy or the right to marry, have gone from focusing on 
property rights to focusing on privacy thanks to landmark cases such as 
Griswold and Katz.194 Indeed, before Katz, the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence focused on property concepts, like trespass.195 But Katz moved 
the Court in the direction of privacy protections, especially regarding the 
home.196 
As a result, the Court’s takings jurisprudence has almost exclusively 
allowed for deferential treatment to takings because such takings usually 
advance an economic-oriented agenda. As the Court long ago explained in 
Carolene Products, “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary” economic 
activity deserves a presumption of rational basis.197 Such adherence to 
deference seeped into the Court’s takings jurisprudence even though the core of 
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the Takings Clause is to protect property owners from excessive government 
regulation.198 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, Justice Brennan 
stated that the Court would adhere to deferential standards and continue to treat 
government land use regulations as nothing more than exercises of police 
powers that deserve the greatest weight of deference, even though the majority 
carved out an ad hoc balancing test that could conceivably be wielded to 
constitutionally rein in local legislation and regulation.199 In Berman v. Parker, 
Justice Douglas surrendered the Court’s substantive due process appetite, 
instead choosing the Court’s longstanding preference to defer to “social 
legislation” for the public good.201 Instead, the Court reiterated that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, may exercise its powers over its affairs, 
commingling the legislature’s broad police powers with “public purpose.”201 
Specifically, Justice Douglas noted “when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive,” and “the legislature, 
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social 
legislation.”202 Indeed, for matters involving the physical seizure of private 
property, the role of the Court, Justice Douglas explained, is “extremely 
narrow.”203 
This is not to say that the Court immediately abandoned some of the 
doctrinal tools left by the Lochner Court; it simply did not hand down rulings 
that were averse to economic regulation of property, notwithstanding having the 
doctrinal tests at its disposal to do so. For example, the Court’s balancing ad hoc 
test in Penn Central could, if the Court decided, be used to strike down a 
regulation that interfered with investment-backed expectations, or in other 
words, regulations that impacted economic interests in the name of class 
legislation.204 The Court’s per se takings tests formulated in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
likewise, give the Court some teeth to chew away at regulations it finds overly 
burdensome or redistributive in nature while nonetheless essentially giving 
governments free rein to regulate property so long as it does not deprive all 
economically viable use or permanently invade private property.206 As scholars 
have noted, this essentially means that the Court defers to and validates the 
government regulations, even if it leaves less than ninety-five percent of the 
property available for use.207 In other words, while the Court has crafted tests 
that, if it chose, could strike down or scale back regulations of property that seek 
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to redistribute based on price or market value, it rarely hands down rulings that 
actually go that far. 
Some argue that the Court’s means-end exactions doctrine under the 
Takings Clause is a return to Lochner-style decision-making.207 Glenn Lunney, 
for example, explains that the Court’s exactions doctrine “is either to ignore 
[precedent] or to use name-calling—Lochnerism!”208 But, as noted above, even 
if today’s Court still has at its disposal the doctrinal tools used by the Lochner 
Court to wield against contemporary “liberal economic policy,” the Court 
simply has refused to go that far.209 Recall the Court’s exactions doctrine for 
example. 
There, in both Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, the majority carved out a heightened standard of review to 
government actions, usually planning commissions, to withhold a building 
permit on condition that the landowner concede to the government’s demand.211 
This is a means-end test that looks at the reasons for the condition and the goal 
that the government is seeking to achieve. Thus, as a result, the government, 
under its exactions doctrine, has the burden to show there is an essential nexus 
and rough proportionality between the public harm caused by the landowner’s 
development and the condition to mitigate that harm. The Court, shortly after its 
Nollan decision, explained that regulating property is unconstitutional unless 
“there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by 
the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy.”211 
In the dissents in both Nollan and Dolan, Justice Brennan and Justice 
Stevens raised concerns that the direction of the Court’s exactions doctrine 
inappropriately brought Lochner into contemporary takings doctrine. For 
example, in Dolan, Justice Stevens leveled a Lochner charge against the 
majority, arguing that the Court had reasserted the reasoning of Lochner by 
advancing a means-end test requiring heightened scrutiny of environmental and 
land use determinations by local governments in a similar vein as the Lochner 
Court did in refusing to presume a connection between the hours regulation on 
working in bakeries and the state interest in protecting the public health and 
safety.212 Justice Brennan, likewise, in Nollan argued that the Court had 
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implemented a Lochner standard that was “discredited for the better part of [a] 
century.”213 Of course, the majority opinion in those cases pushed back, arguing 
that the Court had not resuscitated Lochner.214 Other scholars such as Richard 
Levy, on the other hand, argue that the Lochner-era Court strategy would be a 
welcome addition to today’s takings doctrine, as the “problems plaguing the 
Court in this area can and should be resolved by emerging from Lochner’s 
shadow and integrating economic interests into a broader jurisprudence of 
constitutional rights.”215 
However, the Court’s exactions doctrine does not quite embrace Lochner 
like some have feared.216 The difference is that the Court during the Lochner 
era protected not only core property rights, such as rights of possession, 
acquisition, exclusion, and disposition, but also economic and market values of 
property.217 Today’s Court, on the other hand, protects primarily core property 
rights, such as the right to exclude, acquire, dispose, or develop land, rather than 
protecting from regulations on prices, profits, or market value.218 The Court, it 
seems, “leaves far more of the nation’s property constitutionally unprotected 
from legislation than the Lochner Court did.”219 While the methodology the 
Court employs is reminiscent of Lochner—that is, a means-end heightened 
scrutiny—today’s Court rulings do not extend to protecting income generated 
from property or striking down regulations that redistribute on that basis like the 
Lochner Court did.220 Moreover, with regards to Penn Central, as Barton 
Thompson explains, “[l]acking an underlying rationale for invoking the takings 
protections and haunted by the specter of Lochner, however, this tripartite 
approach has provided virtually no significant restrictions on property 
regulations.”221 
One might say that the main difference is not the type of legislation between 
today’s Court and yesterday’s Lochner Court, but the “proportion” of 
redistributive legislation and regulations at risk.222 Thus, attacks on economic 
legislation affecting property by the Court today have not been on major 
economic legislation by the federal or state governments, but primarily focused 
on environmental and local land use regulations protecting core property 
interests that give rise to the Court’s means-end tests dating from Nollan and 
Dolan, and most recently from Koontz v. St. John’s River Management 
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District.223 It has consistently approved economic regulations affecting 
property, even though the Court, as noted above, still has Lochner-esque 
doctrinal tools in its toolbox to strike down such legislation.224 Even post-Nollan 
and Dolan, the Court has consistently veered down the road of deference 
whenever it can, and clarified some of the heightened standard of review 
language employed in Nollan and Dolan that some argue is a return to 
substantive due process. 
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., for example, Justice O’Connor closed the 
door on the substantive due process inquiries bleeding into takings doctrine, 
finding it inappropriate for the Court to employ a formula that asks whether a 
regulation of private property “substantially advances” legitimate state 
interests.225 There, the majority declined to commingle substantive due process 
inquiries of regulations where the crux of the dispute was whether the regulation 
was a taking.226 Justice O’Connor was compelled to eviscerate due process from 
takings as a way to clean up some messy and “regrettably imprecise” dicta left 
over from Penn Central, where the Court left the door open to the possibility 
that a use restriction on real property could potentially constitute a taking if the 
regulation was not reasonably enacted to pursue a public purpose.227 
Then, Justice O’Connor reverted to the Court’s preferred deferential 
approach, explaining that prior to engaging in inquiries of the underlying 
validity of a regulation, the Court “presupposes that the government has acted 
in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”228 The concern for the majority in Lingle 
was that, if it permitted “substantially advances” inquiries into takings doctrine, 
then the efficacy of “virtually any regulation of private property,” including 
state and federal regulations, could conceivably be scrutinized, thus 
empowering courts to substitute their “predictive judgments for those of elected 
legislatures.”229 Indeed, the Court’s prior rule, that regulations must 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest to survive a takings challenge, 
was rejected in place of its longstanding preference for deference to 
legislatures.230 The same year Lingle was handed down, the Court confirmed its 
willingness to continue its longstanding deference to social and economic 
legislation in Kelo.232 
There, Justice Stevens deferred to a local government’s “economic 
development” policy, explaining, “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined 
[public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to 
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legislative judgments in this field.”232 Justice Stevens invoked a “strong theme 
of federalism” in his opinion, noting that such a history is part of the Court’s 
longstanding “great respect"” owed to state legislatures in discerning local 
public needs in eminent domain determinations.233 He reiterated that while it 
was not the Court’s responsibility to question the legislature’s judgment, 
“nothing” in the opinion “precludes [state legislatures] from placing further 
restrictions” on takings where the government seeks to redistribute private 
property in order to achieve economic development for the broader public.234 
As a result, this deferential treatment in takings doctrine post-Lochner has 
caused the Court to overlook and refuse to apply a heightened standard that 
gives greater protections to homes and homeowners than other forms of 
property. The Court’s refusal to permit special protections to homes is all the 
more curious in light of the many home-centric takings disputes it has reviewed 
post-Lochner and the Court’s simultaneous embrace of homebound doctrines 
under the other Bill of Rights doctrines post-Lochner. 
C. The Home-Less Takings Doctrine 
As a baseline, without plaintiffs who embody the principle of the sanctity 
of the home, the Court has had no reason to extend its takings doctrine to 
specially protect homes or homeowners. The plaintiff in Penn Central was the 
Penn Central Transportation Company, which owned Grand Central 
Terminal.236 Anthony Palazzolo, landowner of beachfront property, was denied 
a permit to develop wetlands into a private beach club.236 David Lucas was the 
owner of two vacant oceanfront lots.237 Chevron was the plaintiff in Lingle.238 
The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency were hundreds of owners of undeveloped land.239 Ms. Dolan 
was the owner of a store who sought to expand the premise and pave a parking 
lot.240 Coy Koontz’s 14.9-acre swath of undeveloped land was slated for 
development.241 Berman concerned the physical seizure of a department 
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store.242 Notwithstanding the Court’s aversion to imposing home-centric 
protections in cases lacking homeowner-plaintiffs, the Court has missed many 
opportunities to bring the Takings Clause into uniformity with the First, Second, 
Third, and Fourth Amendments in cases that dealt with a homeowner or a 
property interest in either building, selling a home, or the seizing of a home.243 
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court was faced 
with a relatively sympathetic landowner in Jean Loretto, owner of a multifamily 
residential apartment building in Manhattan.245 There, the Court missed an 
opportunity to set forth distinctions in physical invasions of property interests 
akin to homes where people live, where elements of personhood thrive, and 
where privacy is sacred. Of course, the invader was not a law enforcement 
officer or a soldier, but a physical cable imposed by a cable company, permitted 
to do so by statute.246 The Court had ample opportunity to give special scrutiny 
to regulations that physically invade or occupy home-like structures. The cable 
company, in fact, argued that it was permitted to physically occupy the 
residence, i.e. install cable boxes, because the property relationship at issue was 
residential rental buildings, and that tenants were granted a property right for 
cables to be placed on the rooftops.246 Indeed, for the majority, such distinctions 
were irrelevant. They questioned “why a physical occupation of one type of 
property but not another type is any less a physical occupation.”247 The physical 
occupation of “plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws” that occupied “space 
immediately above and upon the roof”249 of apartments did not arouse the 
Court’s sympathy towards personhood and houses in a way to announce that 
such physical occupations were, for example, “the chief evil against” takings.249 
One could imagine the Court uttering the sanctity of the home in a revisionist 
version of the Loretto opinion. It did not happen. Two years later, the Court had 
yet another chance to set forth a home-centric doctrine. It failed. 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court was faced with takings 
that were for the purpose of breaking up a land oligopoly where the transfer 
resulted in rental homes being taken from landlords.250 There, the Court 
deferred to social legislation, explaining that Hawaii was merely attempting to 
“reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to 
their monarchs” and that land systems aimed at “forc[ing] . . . individual 
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homeowners” to lease rather than buy was a regulation that was a “classic 
exercise of a State’s police powers.”251 Justice O’Connor, pulling longstanding 
deferential language from the Court’s line of precedent, explained that 
“[j]udicial deference is required because, in our system of government, 
legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced 
by an exercise of the taking power” to reduce the perceived social and economic 
evils of land oligopoly that forces thousands of individual homeowners to lease, 
rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.252 Again, the Court missed an 
opportunity to perhaps provide stricter requirements for takings that impeded 
property interests related to homeowners. 
In Nollan, Mr. and Mrs. Nollan had their building permit to replace their 
already existing bungalow with a larger house denied by the planning 
commission.253 Justice Scalia, the architect of home-like sensibilities in Heller 
and Kyllo, was not persuaded by the rosy, American dream-like profile of the 
Nollan’s small bungalow, which they enjoyed in the summers and even rented 
out to vacationers.255 The Nollans proposed to build a large house, but their 
permit was denied as a result of their refusal to allow a public easement across 
their property in exchange for the permit.255 Justice Scalia’s quirky exactions 
doctrine remained neutral, neither paying attention to nor making a distinction 
between a bungalow or other property in a similar dispute.257 If anything, the 
majority adhered to longstanding notions of the proverbial bundle of sticks, 
noting that the right to exclude is one of the most essential of the sticks.257 
Several years later, in 1992, the Court reviewed David Lucas’s challenge of 
legislation that barred him from building single-family homes on two residential 
lots he purchased.258 He argued the restriction on building permanent habitable 
structures deprived him of all economically viable use of his property.260 It is 
peculiar that the majority, especially the mostly conservative bloc of the Court, 
did not utilize the home-centric nature of the dispute to give greater protections 
to landowners seeking to utilize land to build and invest in homes. For one, the 
South Carolina legislation not only prohibited new buildings, but also restricted 
the “rebuilding of houses” that were previously destroyed by natural causes.260 
This is especially surprising given the trial court’s finding that the appraisal of 
the land concluded that its best and highest use would be “luxury single family 
detached dwellings.”261 Still, the Court found no reason to narrow the scope of 
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its per se test to offer greater protections to landowners of lots who seek to build 
single-family homes. The Court could have carved out an alternative categorical 
test that prohibited legislation that rendered land slated for the development of 
single-family homes a taking if the regulation deprived the landowner of, say, 
more than seventy percent economically viable use of the lots, but all 
economically viable use where the prospective use in dispute was commercial 
or industrial. 
Most recently, in Murr v. Wisconsin, the plaintiffs were landowners of two 
lots, one of which had an old family-owned cabin situated on it.262 The Murr 
children sought to remove the cabin to a different area in order to develop the 
lot in dispute into a new residence.264 But state law prohibited the development 
of the particular lot, thus giving rise to a takings claim.265 This time, the now 
retired Justice Kennedy was inattentive to the personhood narrative of the 
plaintiff. He ruled in favor of the government’s exercise of its powers to regulate 
the lots. In doing so, he never mentioned the arguably unique nature of the 
family cabin as perhaps overregulated.267 
A clue for understanding the mystery behind the Court’s aversion to home-
centric protections in takings can be found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. There, the 
Court paid little attention to Mr. and Mrs. Mahon’s “single private house.”267 
Instead of offering a special limitation on regulations that under protect the 
subsurface subsidence that potentially harms the physical structure and 
economic value of homes, the Court carved out a new “regulatory” takings 
doctrine agnostic to any distinctions in the property interest affected.268 The 
Court was instead more interested in striking down legislation that affected the 
economic value and property interests of a company.270 But the Court did 
reiterate that where exercises of police power are in dispute, the “greatest weight 
is given to the judgment of the legislature.”270 That deference would be the 
standard unless, of course, the regulation goes too far.272 
Likewise, take Justice Brennan’s opinion in Penn Central for another sign. 
There, the Court added a new multifactor ad hoc test to the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence.273 The test allows the Court to strike down regulations it finds 
too offensive to the investment and economic-backed expectations of 
landowners. While such doctrinal tools to attack government land use 
regulations are now available as a result of Penn Central, the Court has, for the 
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most part, declined to bludgeon most local government regulations as takings, 
and has never shaped its ad hoc test to specially protect the homestead. Instead, 
it adheres to deferential standards that treat such regulations as nothing more 
than exercises of police powers that deserve the greatest weight of deference.273 
And recall Justice Douglas’s deference to “social legislation” in Berman for 
an additional hint.274 There, the Court was focused on respecting urban renewal 
as a justifiable public good, making no distinction as to the property taken, 
whether residential homes or commercial businesses.276 Justice Douglas 
explained that “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive” and “the legislature, not the judiciary, 
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.”276 
Similarly, Justice Stevens deferred to a local government’s “economic 
development” policy in Kelo, explaining, “[w]ithout exception, [that] our cases 
have defined [public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of 
deference to legislative judgments in this field.”277 There, the Court seemed 
disinterested in providing homes the same level of protection from government 
expropriation as the home (and its private occupants) receives from warrantless 
searches or the forced quartering of soldiers in peacetime. Kelo, arguably the 
Court’s most contentious home-centric dispute, was a missed opportunity to 
bring harmony with the other homebound amendments. The case was the 
quintessential American dream narrative. There, Ms. Kelo’s little pink house 
was threatened by eminent domain to make way for a major economic 
development project that never came to fruition.279 Justice Stevens’s opinion 
never mentions the home as worthy of additional protections, and certainly does 
not cite to prior rulings under cousin amendments that provided greater 
protections to the home.280 However, in his Kelo dissent, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, troubled by majority’s lack of concern for protecting plaintiffs’ homes, 
explains the oddity of protecting homes in other constitutional contexts but 
refusing to do so under the Takings Clause.281 
There, Justice Thomas stated that the Court has long recognized “the 
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our 
traditions since the origins of the Republic.”281 He then juxtaposes the Fourth 
Amendment’s search and seizure doctrine with the Fifth Amendment’s taking 
doctrine, arguing that it is difficult to square how “citizens are safe from [police 
searches] in their homes, [but] the homes themselves are not” protected from 
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government seizures.282 The Court, he said, has “elsewhere recognized ‘the 
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our 
traditions since the origins of the Republic,’” but that the majority’s ruling 
leaves homes themselves unprotected from taking.283 Perhaps most prescient is 
this excerpt from Thomas’s dissent: “[t]he [majority] tells us that we are not to 
‘second-guess the [legislative] judgments,’” but the real issue is “whether the 
government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing 
down . . . homes,” and as a result something has “gone seriously awry with this 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.”284 He continued: “We would not 
defer to a legislature’s determination of the various circumstances that 
establish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable,” because 
we have recognized the “overriding . . . sanctity of the home.”285 Thomas’s 
passage in his dissent hints at, but does not explicitly answer, the real dilemma 
in the Court’s void in home protections in takings as opposed to other 
homebound doctrines in the Bill of Rights. 
D. Explanations 
Justice Thomas’s dissent is perhaps a useful segue into discussing the lack 
of deference afforded to governmental action against fundamental rights. 
Indeed, as he noted, the Court does not ordinarily defer to the government’s 
determination when it decides to search and seize a home without a warrant.287 
The Constitution fundamentally protects such searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. As for fundamental rights, the Court is skeptical of deferential 
treatment to government determinations. Indeed, the Court does not, as Justice 
Thomas explained, defer to the law enforcement officials’ judgments regarding 
when and if to enter a home or search and seize property without a warrant.288 
It is telling that after the Court’s Carolene Products ruling effectively 
ousted Lochner-era judicial scrutiny to economic legislation from the Court’s 
Bill of Rights jurisprudence, the Court consistently and systematically carved 
out homebound protections in the entire first half of the Bill of Rights, while at 
the same time choosing deference over home-centric doctrines in its takings 
jurisprudence. Indeed, while the Court made short shrift of governments that 
seized homes for economic development or governments that denied building 
permits for single family home developments, it regularly found physical entries 
into the home to be a chief evil or the right to bear arms in the hearth and home 
as more worthy of protection above all other interests. 
The District of Columbia ordinance in Heller restricting gun possession in 
the home, even if for the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, did 
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not receive the kind of deferential treatment an ordinance regulating land use 
would receive. The right to bear arms, the Court emphasized, is a fundamental 
right of the individual, not the collective.289 
The statute at issue in Stanley prohibiting lewd material in the home was 
purportedly enacted to regulate possession of material “thought to be 
detrimental to the welfare” of the citizens.289 But that argument is weakened 
when viewed in light of the constitutional limitations on regulations or 
governmental action that intrudes into one’s privacy. The Court long ago upheld 
restrictions on the commercial sale of certain obscene material as defensible in 
limited contexts for the public welfare. Thus, privacy and speech rights in 
Stanley were violated when viewed as fundamental rights issues by the Court 
requiring closer scrutiny.291 This closer scrutiny permitted the Court to glean at 
the place and space of the violations, and to determine that where such 
legislative offenses occur, the Court will offer additional protections to ensure 
fundamental rights are not violated. 
Likewise, the statute in Payton permitting warrantless arrests and invasions 
in the privacy of the home when emergency or dangerous circumstances are 
afoot was not the kind of economic legislation that the Court would ordinarily 
find for deference.291 Instead, the Court employed protections to fundamental 
rights, as opposed to deference to allowing warrantless arrests to occur.293 
Once placed in this historical context against the backdrop of the post-
Lochner era, the fundamental puzzle—why the Court offers homebound 
protections in its obscenity, gun rights, quartering soldiers, search and seizure, 
and self-incrimination doctrines, but neglects an equivalent doctrine under the 
Takings Clause—becomes clearer. But how can the Court move its takings 
jurisprudence in line with the rest of its homebound sister amendments? Rather, 
is homebound concordance and uniformity across the Bill of Rights, where 
applicable, necessary, or desirable? 
IV. TOWARDS A THEORY OF COHERENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HOME 
There are several broader theoretical implications, if not questions, that 
remain. If textualists are adamant about consistent readings of text, then one 
might suspect that the Court should only recognize special protections in the 
home where the text commands in the Third and Fourth Amendments. Such a 
result would preclude special protections in or to the home involving smut, guns, 
self-incrimination, and takings. Likewise, one might argue that the home-less 
Takings Clause is not defective, but rather that the Court’s other various atextual 
home-centric doctrines are wrong. The concern here is that the “purposivist 
[and] precedent-based interpretive” methods have gone far beyond the text and 
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history to resuscitate and maintain the principle of the sanctity of the home in 
American constitutional law.293 Therefore, it might be said, just leave the home-
less takings doctrine in place. Yet, it is difficult to escape the predominantly 
“atextual nature of the Court’s opinions” involving the home in the other 
amendments,295 and this suggests that the Court’s lack of homebound 
limitations in its takings jurisprudence is evidence that it has failed to engage in 
the same atextual home-centric method of interpretation as its other home-
centric doctrines in the Bill of Rights. In other words, the Court has created 
asymmetry where all doctrinal signs point towards a Bill of Rights of home-
centric symmetry. This instance of incoherence in takings doctrine, then, is 
peculiar. 
Constitutional congruence of home protections offers a comprehensive 
vision of the sanctity of the home in the Bill of Rights that embraces consistency 
and predictability. This constitutional congruence, in other words, offers a 
pragmatic mode of interpretation that harmonizes the home consistently in 
between and across all five amendments, including the Takings Clause. The 
addition of homebound protections in takings would further allow scholars and 
jurists to contemplate the home not solely through the lens of an “individual line 
of constitutional text” as if bound to, say, the Third or Fourth Amendment.295 
Rather, pursuing home protections in the Takings Clause harmonizes home-
centric doctrines in the Bill of Rights as a whole.296 This is achieved by doing 
two things at once: inferring the “home’s constitutional primacy from the 
structure and context of the document itself,”297 and subsequently drawing 
parallels to the sanctity of the home by leaning on precedent and doctrine from 
other doctrines within the Bill of Rights. But what is the theoretical basis for the 
claim that home-centric doctrines across the Bill of Rights should be interpreted 
congruently and coherently to include special protections in the Takings Clause? 
A. Coherence Theory 
Our constitutional culture generally aspires to a theory of coherence. 
Richard Fallon argues that even though the multiple modes of constitutional 
interpretation—text, structure, history, doctrine—are distinct, they are 
interconnected in ways that allow interpreters to find “constructivist 
coherence”—a form of reflective equilibrium that is influenced by reciprocal 
modes of assessment and reassessment.298 This theory calls for scholars and 
jurists to “assess and reassess the arguments in” text, history, precedent, and 
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structure to “understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the same 
result.”299 Doing so, according to Fallon, results in “coherence.”301 This is 
because the modes of interpretation are “substantially interrelated and 
interdependent” and that this reciprocal influence helps achieve constructivist 
coherence “most of the time.”301 Constitutional interpretation “prescribe[s]” to 
embody various interpretations that lead to the “same result.”302 Fallon explains: 
[I]f the conclusions fail to cohere into a uniform prescription for how the case 
or issue ought to resolved, then any or all of the individual conclusions may be 
reexamined, and the results adjusted insofar as plausible within the prevailing 
conventions of constitutional analysis, in an effort to achieve a uniform 
outcome.303 
This is a familiar line of logic that has roots in John Rawls’s teaching of 
“reflective equilibrium” that advocates for an intellectual process of adjusting 
and correcting concepts to achieve a coherent theory.304 Likewise, in the 
constitutional interpretive context, “our constitutional practice” arguably 
implicitly prescribes the attainment of coherence.305 To achieve this coherence 
and ultimately, for example, home-centric congruence in the Bill of Rights, 
interpreters rely upon “patterns of influence and adjustment” to make coherence 
attainable.306 Indeed, under this theory, the claim for constitutional congruence 
of home-centric doctrines across the Bill of Rights is substantially supported by 
the fact that interpreters must utilize, among other methods, textualism and 
doctrinalism to fully appreciate the desire for a coherent homebound Bill of 
Rights. 
In each separate amendment in the first half of the Bill of Rights, the Court 
has utilized a variety of interpretive tools to find a zone of protections in or to 
the home. While smut is given an atextual and largely doctrinal protective 
treatment inside the home, derived largely from the textual home-centric 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, both interpretive tools were used to 
achieve symmetry in home protections.308 Likewise, the Second Amendment’s 
atextual and historical treatment by Justice Scalia in Heller relied upon the 
atextual First Amendment and the textual Fourth Amendment to find consistent 
application of a homebound protection to the right to bear arms the “hearth and 
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home.”309 The interconnectedness that Fallon speaks to plays out in the Court’s 
prominent Kelo decision, as mentioned in Part III.310 
The Kelo ruling was arguably a commensurability problem. That problem 
raises the question of what category of interpretation should be used when 
invoking a particular interpretive tool results in different outcomes. Inevitably, 
Fallon concludes that “blurring occurs in some cases between” some of the 
categories of constitutional interpretation.310 Rereading Thomas’s dissent with 
an eye towards coherence theory seems to suggest that Justice Thomas was 
seeking to extend the home-centric doctrinal thread from searches to takings—
two amendments adjoined at the hip, but distinct in approaches to home 
protections. 
There, Justice Thomas was concerned with the specter of incoherence, 
noting that the Court has “elsewhere [in the Fourth Amendment] recognized ‘the 
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our 
traditions since the origins of the Republic.’”311 Indeed, textually he finds the 
“house” substantially protected in the Fourth Amendment, but unprotected in 
the Takings Clause.313 He wants it both ways. His concern was that since the 
Court specially protects persons from warrantless searches and seizures in the 
home, why should the government be capable of tearing down homes without 
special limitations? By not reading the Fourth Amendment protections of the 
home congruently with the Fifth Amendments protections to private property, 
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution had 
“gone seriously awry.”313 Here, textualism and doctrinalism seem to converge 
and be interrelated (or blurred) in those few lines of Justice Thomas’s dissent. 
This “reciprocal influence” between interpretive methods seemed to color 
Justice Thomas’s implicit plea for coherence. In other words, it would seem that 
bringing closure to the homebound schism in the Bill of Rights, as this Article 
calls for, is simply part of the evolution of coherence theory. 
Likewise, in the late 1800s, the Court in Boyd expressly commingled the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections to unlawful searches and self-
incrimination in the home, with the text and accompanying doctrine from both 
amendments running “almost into each other.”314 This was arguably yet another 
attempt at achieving some coherence, and aligns with the Third Amendment’s 
mandate to prohibit quartering of soldiers during peacetime.315 The Court’s 
Stanley ruling was arguably yet another attempt to thread an additional 
amendment to homebound coherence, as the Court explained that “[i]f the First 
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Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, 
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch.”316 And again in Payton, the Court sought to achieve an advanced thread 
of coherence by finding that “the physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”317 Finally, 
Justice Scalia leaned on the Fourth Amendment’s explicit homebound 
protections arising in Payton to declare, in Heller, that there existed an elevated 
right to bear arms in the “hearth and home” above all other interests under the 
Second Amendment.318 Again, underlying these home-centric doctrinal moves 
is an implicit attempt at coherence theory in constitutional law. Fallon’s 
“constructive” variation of coherence theory is useful in understanding the 
process of utilizing each interpretive method to find the same result where 
possible. Indeed, doing so raises, yet again, the prevailing question in this 
Article. Why not apply coherence theory to the Takings Clause as a theoretical 
ground to extend the home-centric doctrinal threat to takings? 
B. Consilience 
This Article’s conception of the home-centric Bill of Rights begins to look 
and sound like Jules Coleman’s definition of consilience theory—that is, “other 
things equal, it is good when a theory can bring a diversity of phenomena under 
a single explanatory scheme.”319 Take Newton’s theory of gravitation, and all 
its conceptions of orbiting planets around the sun. Prior to Newton’s theories, 
these conceptions were, in the language of constitutional scholars, “individual 
line[s] of constitutional text” under each Amendment in the Bill of Rights 
viewed and understood separately from each other.320 Instead, consilience 
would ask interpreters to view certain aspects of the Bill of Rights, such as home 
protections, “as a whole.”321 
Jules Coleman explains this phenomenon through the lens of tort and 
criminal law. The two, he argues, are interconnected.323 In fact, the two might 
be “unified” under a theory of consilience that shows “why we need these 
distinct bodies of law, each with its distinct and ineliminable principles.”323 
Likewise, the Bill of Rights, while offering constitutional rights and protections, 
also espouses generally distinct bodies of constitutional law. Yet, to view these 
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bodies of law as interrelated and interconnected is to “explain how the modes 
of practical reasoning and substantive principle realized in each part of the law 
express fundamentally or unavoidably (perhaps even necessarily) unique 
features of that part.”324 Indeed, applying substantive principles in home-centric 
doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination gives 
scholars and jurists a sense of equilibrium that arguably justifies an extension to 
takings. As Coleman explains in consilience theory: 
The basic point is simply that a good explanation can show how various parts 
of the whole differ from one another in some systematic or principled way, and 
how their doing so contributes to the coherence of the whole. In the limiting 
case, such an explanation might demonstrate that different parts of the whole 
are necessarily distinct, and that the principles or concepts involved in each are 
unique.325 
Indeed, the “norm of consilience tells us only that a theory that explains” 
Second Amendment law “in terms of a given set of principles is better to the 
extent that those principles can also explain other practices” such as Takings 
Clause law.326 Thus, “the theory contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the whole.”327 
C. Harmony 
Several questions emerge after answering why the Court’s Bill of Rights 
jurisprudence fails to provide equivalent protections to homes in takings and 
why the Court, as a matter of coherence theory, should actively carve out a 
takings doctrine that specially protects homes. The logical next step is to ask 
how should the Court construct a homebound pronouncement that brings the 
Court’s takings jurisprudence into harmony with its counterparts. This is no easy 
task, because while a “man’s home may be his castle . . . that does not keep the 
Government from taking it” under the prevailing takings doctrine.328 A “general 
limitation [on taking homes] has not developed.”329 Indeed, it seems 
“anomalous” that “some explicit protection to family homes from government 
taking[s]” has not developed.330 While the Takings Clause “prohibits the taking 
of any home (or other private property) without just compensation,”331 it does 
not, in any real sense, offer special protections to homes. 
As some scholars have noted, “one might expect to find an implied 
limitation on the eminent domain power” that protects a “special class of 
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property like a family home” from a taking “unless the government shows a 
‘compelling state interest’ and that [the] taking . . . is the ‘least intrusive 
alternative.’”332 This is, in other words, an argument for strict scrutiny where 
homes are at stake. In the Court’s Kelo decision, Justice Kennedy along with the 
three dissenting Justices, raised the prospect of the Court imposing heightened 
scrutiny to takings by peering into the motives behind government takings for 
economic development purposes.334 
As Justice Kennedy noted, the majority opinion does not “foreclose the 
possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . . might be appropriate for 
a more narrowly drawn category of takings.”334 Thus, it is plausible that the 
Takings Clause could be brought in line with its cousin home-centric provisions 
by relying upon a more stringent standard of review or simply heightened 
review where homes are threatened by condemnation. Admittedly, “[e]ven if 
the Court began applying heightened scrutiny” as Justice Kennedy suggested, 
“it is far from certain that homes would receive any special protection.”335 Some 
scholars have questioned Kelo critics, noting that many “have not clearly 
articulated a textually grounded constitutional rationale that justifies specifically 
protecting homes from condemnation.”336 
There are, nonetheless, several tweaks that could be made to the Court’s 
prevailing takings doctrine, including all three veins—eminent domain, 
regulatory, and exactions—to carve out protections to homes under the Takings 
Clause, thereby bringing congruence across the first half of the Bill of Rights. 
A special limitation to taking homes may offer broad special safety to the 
historical targeting of homes by local governments.337 The root of this Article’s 
extension of special protections to homes in the takings context lies in what 
Barton Thompson coins as the “consequential fit” in takings; that is, the Court’s 
scrutiny of the “relationship between the actions or status of a property owner 
and the burden imposed on the property owner by the challenged regulation.”338 
Indeed, Thompson is referring to the Court’s exactions doctrine born from 
Nollan and Dolan, which offers the Court the doctrinal teeth to “sink . . . into 
the meaty and meaningful question of whether particular property owners, rather 
than society more broadly, should bear the cost of public goods and services.”339 
The concern, as discussed above, is that such doctrinal teeth invites “allusions” 
to Lochner.340 Yet, this concern is overstated, since the Court does not invalidate 
government exercises of police power where the effect is price controls on 
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property. Rather, the Court has remained steadfast with its approach to actions 
that impact land development or environmental regulations. Thus, one way to 
conceptualize a home-centric Takings Clause in harmony with the rest of the 
Bill of Rights is to find a happy-medium doctrine amidst the dizzying array of 
available takings doctrines to limit regulations that affect homes or require 
greater than fair market value in compensation for the taking. 
1. Means-End Public Use Inquiry 
One such alteration to takings doctrine would be for the Court, in limited 
circumstances, to embrace Lochner-like searching scrutiny by applying its 
exactions tests as a special doctrine solely for takings that expropriate title or 
affect the economic value of core property interests, such as homes.341 The 
exactions heightened scrutiny test would be applied only where the economic 
value of a core property interest, such as homeownership, is diminished, 
destroyed, or expropriated by the governmental action. In other words, where 
homes are subject to a taking, the Court’s exactions heightened scrutiny tests 
would “carry over to other portions of the takings clause,”342 including eminent 
domain and regulatory taking to create a special homebound limitation under 
the Takings Clause. This would give rise to the Court adopting and applying a 
special means-end test as a homebound limitation doctrine. 
Indeed, adopting a special limitation for taking homes requires the Court to 
abandon, in limited circumstances, its post-Lochner deferential standard of 
review and, instead, requires the government to connect the means for which it 
achieves the end when taking homes. Richard Epstein and Nicole Garnett have 
raised the prospect of exactions doctrine seeping into public use doctrine.343 
Such a doctrinal move would arguably threaten prior rulings, such as Midkiff or 
Kelo.344 This would fit with the narrative that the Court, as a matter of 
concordance and coherence with its other homebound amendments, desert post-
Lochner deference by abandoning rational basis and instead mandating 
governments show a rational connection between the means of condemning 
homes and the public use end.346 Such a test would require a showing that the 
taking of homes is “reasonably necessary” to advance the public purpose 
proposed, such as economic development.346 
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As with most exactions inquiries, this is a difficult heightened standard for 
governments to meet. It requires extensive studies and data, including factual 
evidence, to show direct and rational connections between the condemnation of 
homes and the ultimate public purpose. Drawing upon public use challenges by 
homeowners might offer a more “narrowly focused and judicially manageable 
inquiry” in takings involving houses.347 If the Court had given the Nollan’s 
bungalow searching judicial protection, then perhaps the cross-pollination 
argument of exaction jurisprudence into public use to provide a homebound 
limitation would be strengthened. Even under the Court’s regulatory takings 
doctrine, it would seem that “courts would protect one’s home to a far greater 
extent than one’s commercial plans, even if the result, in purely monetary terms, 
seems irrational.”348 Some scholars have raised the broader normative point that 
where property interests in dispute are “personal” or give rise to “personhood,” 
there should be available a “prima facie case that [such a] right should be 
protected to some extent against invasion by government.”349 Indeed, the 
Court’s exactions doctrine is perhaps the most potent area of takings that could 
give rise to special homestead protections. 
For example, the Court’s longstanding deferential treatment to its public use 
inquiry from Berman to Kelo would require governments to connect the “means 
by which it acquires land to the particular purpose” when condemning homes.350 
Indeed, the Supreme Court would “put the government to its proof—requiring 
a demonstrated connection between” the taking of homes and the specific 
purpose used to justify the taking.351 
2. Penn Central Ad Hoc Test 
Under a normative homebound takings doctrine, the Court’s Penn Central 
ad hoc balancing test would place the burden on the government, rather than the 
challenger, to show the regulation did not affect the investment-backed 
expectations of the homeowner. Indeed, had Penn Central been a homeowner, 
then the “character” of the governmental action would be given searching 
scrutiny by the Court. Perhaps more important would be the investment-backed 
expectations of the home. Homeowners, unlike developers, do not necessarily 
view their immovable structure as a strong fungible asset, because most 
Americans are single-family homeowners and rarely own more than one 
home.353 Thus, the investment-backed expectation would arguably exceed that 
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of the typical developer-landowner. Regulations that impede on the economic 
value of the home in even the slightest of cases should be construed as enjoying 
special protection from the regulation in dispute, whether invalidation or 
compensation formulas that offers more than fair market value. 
One could conceive of a doctrine that limits the taking of homes by requiring 
greater compensation, particularly in tests such as Penn Central.353 Indeed, a 
“homeowner’s emotional attachment to her home merits special respect, either 
in the compensation formula or in some other appropriate way.”354 Given the 
Court’s focus on homes elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, it makes sense, then, for 
vigilance in protecting private dwellings.355 Not giving special preference for or 
protections to investors whose property is taken might make sense, but as for 
those homeowners “displaced from [their] homestead[s], the matter seems 
different” because houses “are not merely fungible investments,” but rather they 
entail personhood—elements that cannot be quantified.356 
This would require a very different calculation of just compensation when 
considering seizing homes where personal history, loved ones, and people’s 
lives are intertwined in the fabric of the property.357 In other words, government 
would be required to engage in a “very different kind of calculus” when seeking 
to condemn a home by giving a “bonus above fair market value in setting the 
rate of just compensation.”358 While investors could potentially abuse this 
“bonus,” it is still an arguably necessary recalculation of the traditional just 
compensation rate because homeowners assets are not fungible, but instead 
involve elements of personhood unlikely to be considered in a typical fair 
market valuation.359 A typical homeowner values his property very differently 
than the market,360 and thus the market value does not “compensate landowners 
completely.”361 In other words, the government simply cannot capture person’s 
interests in memories, community, friends, family, stability, and comfort into 
fair market value, because these “elements are far more valuable than the 
marketable elements of property.”362 These considerations are sharply different 
than considerations of a business owner’s fair market value when facing 
condemnation, and these differences impact appraisals.364 One could imagine 
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the government being required to pay an additional “bonus” or fee when 
condemning homes to mitigate any hint of unfairness or inefficiency in Penn 
Central challenges that show some governmental interference with investment-
backed expectations.364 
3. Less than All Economically Viable Use 
The Court’s Lucas test, likewise, would be strengthened by either 
invalidating a regulation altogether or requiring above-market compensation 
when the regulation has reduced the market value of the home by twenty-five 
percent (or some other decisional percentage), instead of the constitutional 
baseline of “all economically viable use” of the home.365 In other words, homes 
would enjoy a test that would invalidate a regulation or require above market 
compensation where the regulation deprived the homeowner of less than all 
economically viable use of the property, while all other forms of private 
property would be subject to the traditional test of all economically viable use. 
The Lucas case, in and of itself, presented a missed opportunity to embark on 
this kind of test, but Justice Blackmun’s dissent offers a homebound roadmap. 
David Lucas was seeking a permit to build single-family homes on his 
undeveloped land.367 Justice Blackmun’s dissent engages with the trial court 
record, noting that the appraised value of Lucas’s undeveloped land was 
determined “based on the fact that the ‘highest and best use’” was “luxury” 
single-family detached homes.368 This suggested the value was determined only 
based on its best use, and anything less than the best use rendered the 
undeveloped land valueless.369 Further, Justice Blackmun chastised the majority 
for disposing of a doctrine that looks at each case and its particular 
circumstances to determine whether a regulation renders the need for just 
compensation to a property owner.370 Of course, a less than all economically 
viable use test may threaten such a home-centric claim because local 
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governments could, conceivably, simply argue that the regulation is nothing 
more than exercise of their police power untethered to a takings claim. 
Notably, Justice Stevens’s dissent raises the prospect that Lucas may not 
have even met a “temporary takings” claim entitled to just compensation 
because it is unclear when Lucas planned to build and to what extent the statute 
“temporarily” frustrated his building plans.371 Justice Stevens notes that under 
the majority’s per se rule, Lucas would lose nearly all his land value if—say 
95%—were deprived, whereas a similarly situated landowner would be entitled 
to just compensation if 100% were deprived.372 It would seem that where homes 
are in dispute, the opposite would be true. The home would be elevated above 
all other property interests. A regulation that diminishes 100% or less of value 
of the home would require just compensation for the homeowner, whereas 
commercial or industrial property would be subject to the traditional per se test 
of all economically viable use. 
4. Temporary Physical Invasion 
Likewise, the Court’s Loretto test would also be stricter where the 
challenger is a homeowner. For example, it would be enough for the homeowner 
to mount a challenge under a home-centric regulatory takings challenge when 
the “character of the governmental action” is a temporary, rather than 
permanent, physical occupation or invasion of the home, regardless of the public 
purpose or benefit of the regulation.372 Broadening the scope of the Loretto test 
is important for purposes of conceptualizing a harmonious and congruent home-
centric Bill of Rights—it offers seamless thematic and doctrinal associations 
across adjoining and non-adjoining Bill of Rights doctrines that protect the 
home.373 Historically, the Court has only entertained permanent physical 
occupations as subject to the Takings Clause.375 However, the Court’s lackluster 
reasoning in Loretto (why permanent occupation rather than temporary 
invasion?) left the door open for the Court to entertain challenges where the 
governmental action temporarily invades or occupies the home. 
5. Class of One Homeowner Protections 
Recall Carolene Products. Footnote four suggested that discrete and insular 
groups may enjoy a “more searching judicial inquiry” or “exacting judicial 
scrutiny” than economic regulations and social legislation.375 This approach 
would offer strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, but leave economic and social 
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legislation to rational basis review.377 To effectively bring the home into the 
ambit of the homebound pronouncements made regarding smut, guns, soldiers, 
searches, and self-incrimination, the Court would need to remove itself from the 
ghost of post-Lochner era deference. One way to do this is to entertain the Equal 
Protection Clause as a vehicle to allow the Court to engage in searching inquiries 
of a discrete and insular group, such as homeowners. Justice Thomas, in his 
Kelo dissent, likewise noted that “intrusive judicial review” was necessary to 
protect “discrete and insular minorities” from takings.377 One might argue that 
this implied that minority homeowners, specifically, were threatened by a 
deferential takings standard, since they are traditionally a politically 
underrepresented group. Thus, governments will be incentivized to target 
minority homeowners because such takings would be the path of least 
resistance. Some scholars have called for eminent domain that seizes homes 
from low-income people as impermissible due to inadequate representation of 
minority groups in the political process.378 This would arguably mitigate the 
number of poor people forced to lose their homes “simply because they are 
poor.”379 
The Court’s ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech perhaps provides a 
strong doctrinal candidate for a homebound limitation in takings, or at the very 
least, a cross-pollinated example of finding greater protections from within 
constitutional standards.381 There, the Court held that homeowners were 
permitted to sue under Equal Protection as a “class of one” in the context of 
zoning.382 However, some argued that such an argument could be used in the 
eminent domain context. If a group of homeowners, as opposed to other 
landowners, were singled out for condemnation, then it is possible that a 
homeowner could “bring suit to challenge the arbitrariness of the decision to 
take the property” in violation of Equal Protection.383 This argument is 
predicated on Equal Protection and enforced by Section 1983 causes of action 
that allege government agencies and officers intentionally treated homeowners 
differently than other similarly situated landowners.384 Such an argument is 
pronounced when race is considered.385 
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For example, “if all homeowners in a group targeted for eminent domain 
were black,” and similarly situated landowners not threatened by condemnation 
were white, then a discrete and insular minority group would essentially be 
treated differently in violation of Equal Protection.386 The essence of the “class 
of one” theory is that it does not ask whether eminent domain is “necessary to 
achieve a certain public purpose, but rather scrutinizes the decision to take the 
particular plot of property.”387 However, it is important to note here that such a 
homebound protection exists outside the Takings Clause, since a “class of one” 
theory has only been applied under Equal Protection challenges.388 Indeed, the 
Takings Clause protects property rights and does not search for or find 
discrimination. The Takings Clause in and of itself, therefore, is unlikely to be 
the venue for remedying discrimination against minority homeowners.389 
Nonetheless, given the nature of the doctrinalism used by the Court in its home-
centric doctrines involving smut or soldiers, the “class of one” theory may offer 
a legitimate homebound limitation in takings under Equal Protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the fundamental puzzle of the Bill of Rights’ 
distinctive textual and doctrinal protections to the home. Indeed, the Court’s 
jurisprudence involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination 
extends protections to the home, but inexplicably does not in takings. The 
reason, it seems, is that the former doctrines have proven immune to post-
Lochner era judicial deference to economic regulation, largely as a result of the 
Court acknowledging those protections as fundamental, whether enumerated or 
unenumerated, particularly privacy protections. Yet, the Court can bring 
harmony to the homebound Bill of Rights by, among other proposals, adjusting 
several of its public use and regulatory takings tests. 
The importance of connecting all the homebound dots and then reorienting 
all the pieces of the puzzle cannot be overstated. The Court’s home-centric 
doctrines are mostly atextual. Doctrinalism has pushed the Court’s Justices, 
whether liberal or conservative, to adhere to a purposivist or precedent-based 
interpretive methodology where homes are central to a dispute, even if the home 
is not textually explicit in a particular Amendment. What we find by applying 
an interpretive methodology of doctrinalism to the Takings Clause is clarity, 
coherence, and consistency in protections to the home. This extension of the 
home-centric doctrinal thread to the Takings Clause offers scholars and jurists 
a theoretical justification for homebound coherence across the Bill of Rights. 
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